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Abstract
In the past 50 years, the world accelerated its transition out of long-term
demographic stability. As infant and child mortality rates fell, populations began
to soar. In most countries, this growth led to falling fertility rates.Although fertility
has fallen, the population continues to increase because of population momentum;
it will eventually level off. In the meantime, demographic change has created a
‘bulge’ generation, which today appears in many countries as a large working-age
population. This cohort will eventually become a large elderly population, in both
developed and developing countries. Population growth has been the subject of
great debate among economists and demographers.Until recently,most have agreed
on a middle ground, in which population growth per se has no effect on economic
growth. New evidence suggests that changes in the age structure of populations
– in particular, a rising ratio of working-age to non-working-age individuals –
leads to the possibility of more rapid economic growth, via both accounting and
behavioural effects. The experiences of east Asia, Ireland and sub-Saharan Africa
all serve as evidence of the effect of demographic change on economic growth (or
lack thereof). Both internal migration (from rural to urban areas) and international
migration complicate this picture. The overall implications of population growth
for policy lie in the imperative for investments in health and education, and for
sound policies related to labour, trade and retirement. Understanding future trends
is essential for the development of good policy. Demographic projections can be
quite reliable, but huge uncertainties – in the realms of health, changes in human
life span, scientific advances, migration, global warming and wars – make overall
predictions extremely uncertain.
. David EBloom is Professor of Economics andDemography at theHarvard School of PublicHealth
(dbloom@hsph.harvard.edu). David Canning is Professor of Economics and International Health
at the Harvard School of Public Health (dcanning@hsph.harvard.edu). The authors thank the John
D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation and the
National Institute of Aging for supporting much of the research on which this paper is based. The
authors also thank Larry Rosenberg for his assistance with this work.
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1. �ntroduct�on

For much of human history, demographic patterns were reasonably stable;
human populations grew slowly, and the age structures, birth rates, and death rates
of populations changed only gradually. Epidemics and pandemics had huge effects
on populations, but these effects were short-lived and had little bearing on long-
term trends.
In the past 50 years, however, this trend of long-term stability has given way to
the biggest demographic upheaval in history, an upheaval that is still running its
course. In the developed world, a sharp post-war rise in fertility was followed by an
equally sharp fall. These changes in fertility transformed age structures through the
creation of a ‘baby boom’ generation. The ageing of this generation and continued
declines in fertility and old-age mortality are shifting the population balance in
developed countries from young to old. In the meantime, the developing world has
experienced a population explosion, the result of improved nutrition, public health
infrastructure and medical care.
Even if high fertility – the main underlying cause of rapid population growth –
were to suddenly adjust to the long-run replacement level of 2. childrenperwoman,
humanity would continue to experience demographic change for some time. The
rapid increase in the global population over the past few decades has resulted in
large numbers of people of childbearing age. This creates ‘population momentum’,
in which the populations of most countries, even those with falling birth rates, will
grow for many years to come. This is particularly true of developing countries.
Population changes have potentially huge implications for the pace and progress
of economic development. For example, an increasing proportion of elderlymay act
as a drag on economic growth where smaller working populations must provide for
a larger number of non-working dependents. Rising life expectancy can also bolster
aneconomybycreatingagreater incentive to saveand to invest in education, thereby
boosting the financial capital on which investors draw and the human capital that
strengthens economies. Where a country has experienced a baby boom followed
by a decline in fertility, the relative size of the workforce is increased. Countries
that are able to absorb the baby boom generation into productive employment can
experience a rapid increase in economic growth. Countries unable to take advantage
of this opportunity run the risk of creating large, chronically underemployed and
increasingly restive working-age populations.
. Notes on sources used,UnitedNationsprojections anddefinitionsof demographic indicators appear
in Appendix A.
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. Global Demograph�c �rends and �atterns
The global population, which stood at just over 2 billion in 950, is 6.5 billion
today. Theworld is currently gaining new inhabitants at a rate of 76million people a
year (representing the difference, in 2005, between 34million births and 58million
deaths). Although this growth is slowing, middle-ground projections suggest the
world will have 9. billion inhabitants by 2050, when growthwill be approximately
34 million a year.
These past and projected additions to world population have been, and will
increasingly be, distributed unevenly across the world. Today, 95 per cent of
population growth occurs in developing countries (see Figure ). The population
of the world’s 50 least-developed countries is expected to more than double by the
middle of this century, with several poor countries tripling their population over the
period. By contrast, the population of the developed world is expected to remain
steady at around .2 billion, with population declines in some wealthy countries.
The disparity in population growth between developed and developing countries
reflects the existence of considerable heterogeneity in birth, death and migration
processes, both over time and across national populations, races and ethnic groups.
Thedisparityhascoincidedwithchanges in theage-groupcompositionofpopulations.
An overview of these factors illuminates the mechanisms of global population
growth and change.
F�gure 1: World �opulat�on
Note: Data after 2005 are based on projections.
Source: UN Population Division (2005)
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.1 Crude b�rth and death rates
One of the simplest ways to consider population growth is through crude birth
and death rates. These are the number of births and deaths per  000 people. On a
worldwide basis, the difference between these rates is the rate of population growth.
Within regions or countries, population growth is also affected by emigration and
immigration. Figure 2 shows that in both developed and developing regions the
crude birth rate has decreased by about half over the past 50 years. This implies
a much greater absolute reduction in developing regions. The net result of these
reductions is a current crude birth rate in developing regions that is similar to that
of the developed regions 50 years ago.
As Figure 3 shows, crude death rates follow a different pattern. The reduction in
mortality in developing countries since 950 has been very rapid – so rapid that the
crude death rate in developing countries is now lower than in developed countries.
The gradual rise in the crude death rate in developed countries results from the
combination of relatively steady infant and child mortality rates and rising death
rates due to an ageing population. The figure indicates that a similar rise in the death
rate will begin in developing countries in a couple of decades.
Figure 4 demonstrates the combined effect of crude birth and death rates on
population growth rates, as modified by migration (primarily from developing to
developed regions).
F�gure : Crude B�rth Rate
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F�gure 3: Crude Death Rate
Deaths per  000 population
Notes: Dates refer to the beginning of the 5-year window. Data after 2005 are based on projections.
Source: UN Population Division (2005)
F�gure 4: �opulat�on Growth Rate
Average annual
Notes: Dates refer to the beginning of the 5-year window. Data after 2005 are based on projections.
Source: UN Population Division (2005)
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. �otal fert�l�ty rate
The total fertility rate, that is the number of children born per woman, fell from
about 5 in 950 to a little over 2.5 in 2005 (see Figure 5). This number is projected
to fall to about 2 by 2050. This decrease is attributable largely to changes in fertility
in the developing world. In 950, the total fertility rate among developed countries
was already below 3 children per woman; the rate among developing countries was
over 6. Fertility in the latter is nowbelow3 children perwoman.The fertility decline
in low-income countries can be ascribed to a number of factors, including declines
in infant mortality rates, greater levels of education and increased labour market
opportunities among women, and the provision of family planning services.
F�gure 5: �otal Fert�l�ty Rate
Children born per woman
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.3 �nfant and ch�ld mortal�ty decl�ne
Thedevelopingworld has seen significant reductions in infant and childmortality
over the past 50 years (see Figure 6). Infant mortality (death prior to age ) in
developing countries has dropped from 80 to about 57 deaths per  000 live births.
It is projected to decline further to fewer than 30 deaths per  000 live births by 2050.
The past half-century’s gains resulted primarily from improved nutrition, public
health interventions related to water and sanitation, and medical advances such as
the use of vaccines and antibiotics. Infant mortality rates in the developed world
have been, and will continue to be, significantly lower those than in the developing
world. Developed countries have seen infant mortality decline from 59 to 7 deaths
per  000 live births since 950, and this is projected to decline further still, to 4
by 2050. Child mortality (death prior to age 5) has also fallen, in both developed
and developing countries.
Figure 7 addresses awidely discussed issue relevant to infant and childmortality:
‘missing women’. Perhaps because of the selective abortion of female foetuses or
because of female infanticide, there is a severe exaggeration in a few countries of
the usual pattern of boys aged 0–4 outnumbering young girls of the same ages.
F�gure 6: �nfant Mortal�ty Rate
Deaths per  000 live births
Notes: Dates refer to the beginning of the 5-year window. Data after 2005 are based on projections.
Source: UN Population Division (2005)
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.4  �fe e pectancy and longe �ty
For the world as a whole, life expectancy increased from 47 years in 950–955
to 65 years in 2000–2005. It is projected to rise to 75 years by the middle of this
century, with considerable disparities between the wealthy developed countries, at
82 years, and the less-developed countries, at 74 years (see Figure 8). As a result
of the global decline in fertility, and because people are living longer, median age
is rising (see Figure 9). The proportion of the elderly in the total population is
rising sharply. The number of people over the age of 60, currently around half the
numberof those aged5–24, is expected to reachbillion (overtaking the5–24 age
group) by 2020. It is projected to reach almost 2 billion by 2050. The proportion
of individuals aged 80 or over is projected to rise from  per cent to 4 per cent of
the global population by 2050. (Figure 0 shows the history and projections for the
actual number of individuals aged 80 or above.) Population ageing is occurring in
both developed and developing countries, although more rapidly in the former. In
the developed world, the proportion of people aged 60 or over will increase from 20
to 32 per cent by 2050. In the developing world, it will rise from 8 to 20 per cent.
There are gender differences in life expectancy. Figure  shows that life expectancy
for women tends to be around 4 to 6 years longer than for men, although there is
considerable variation across countries.
F�gure 7: Number of Countr�es �n wh�ch Males per 100 Females
�s �n a G� en Range, Age 0–4
2005
Source: UN Population Division (2005)
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F�gure 8:  �fe E pectancy
Notes: Dates refer to the beginning of the 5-year window. Data after 2005 are based on projections.
Source: UN Population Division (2005)
F�gure 9: Med�anAge
Note: Data after 2005 are based on projections.
Source: UN Population Division (2005)
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F�gure 10: Number of �eople Aged 80 orAbo e
Note: Data after 2005 are based on projections.
Source: UN Population Division (2005)
F�gure 11: Number of Countr�es �n wh�ch Female  onge �ty E ceeds
that of Males by a G� en Range of Years
2000–2005
Source: UN Population Division (2005)
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The positive correlation between life expectancy and income, which was first
discussed in detail by Preston (975), is one of the most central relationships in
the fields of international health and development. Preston observed the strong,
positive relationship between national income levels and life expectancy in poorer
countries, though the relationship is nonlinear as life expectancy levels in richer
countries are less sensitive to variations in average income. Preston also noted that
life expectancy is increasing over time at all income levels. Although the basic
facts set out by Preston are generally accepted, the mechanisms that lie behind the
relationships and the policy implications we can draw from them are still disputed.
Bloom and Canning (forthcoming) discuss Preston’s paper in detail.
.5 Age d�str�but�on: work�ng-age populat�on
Baby booms have altered the demographic landscape in many countries. As the
experiencesof several regionsduring thepast centuryshow,an initial fall inmortality
rates creates a boom generation because high survival rates lead to more people at
young ages than in earlier generations. Fertility rates fall subsequently, as parents
realise they do not need to produce as many children to reach their desired family
size, or as desired family size diminishes for other reasons. When fertility falls
and the baby boom stops, the age structure of the population then shows a ‘bulge’
– the baby-boom-age cohort – created by the nonsynchronous falls in mortality and
fertility. As this cohort works its way through the age structure of the population, it
represents a share of the population larger than the share represented by the cohorts
that precede or follow it (see Figure 2).
The baby boom creates particular challenges and opportunities for countries.
In its youth, it is a large cohort to be educated. Jimenez and Murthi (2006), in
addressing the challenges of a large youth cohort (ages 2–24), stress the importance
for long-term economic growth of investing in education and health of the young
and the need to ease entry into the labour market for this group. Once of age to
enter the labour force, the baby boom generation represents an unusually large
working-age (approximately ages 5–64) population, which offers the prospect
of a ‘demographic dividend’. Lee and Mason (2006) describe two aspects of the
demographic dividend: falling fertility, leading to more workers per capita and
thereforepotentiallymore resources todevote todevelopment and to familywelfare,
and extra savings generated when people expect a longer retirement period. (See
also Bloom, Canning and Sevilla 2002.)
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.6 M�grat�on
Migration also alters population patterns. Globally, 9 million people live in
countries other than the one in which they were born. On average, during the next
45 years, theUnitedNations estimates that over 2.2million individuals will migrate
annually fromdeveloping todevelopedcountries (seeFigure3). (TheUNestimates
regarding future migration are not very informative, a reflection of the inherent
difficulty of constructing accurate projections of migration flows.)According to the
UN Population Division, the United States will receive by far the highest number
of immigrants (. million a year), and China, Mexico, India, the Philippines and
Indonesia will be the main sources of emigrants.
Several factors affect migration from developing to developed countries. A
significantnumberofworking-agepeople indevelopingcountriesareunderemployed
relative to the opportunities they perceive in developed countries.At the same time,
developed countries face a declining share of working-age people and a growing
number of elderly who need care, creating more opportunities for immigrants.
Because migrants are disproportionately of working age, migration can affect the
age distribution in both sending and receiving countries. The ratio of workers to
dependents will tend to rise more slowly in sending countries and decline more
slowly in receiving countries than it otherwise would. Williamson (2006) provides
an economic explanation of the emigration life cycle. First, people are too poor to
emigrate; this is the ‘migration poverty trap’.As wealth increases and demographic
booms begin, more people are able to emigrate and more are driven to emigrate.
F�gure 1: Rat�o of Work�ng-age to Non-work�ng-age �opulat�on
Note: Data after 2005 are based on projections.
Source: UN Population Division (2005)
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Emigration later subsides in response to remittances, industrialisation, conditions
improving at home, and there being relatively fewer workers. In the case of Europe,
as transport and industrialisation spread within the continent, the poorer countries
joined the richer ones in sending migrants to the Americas.
.7  rban�sat�on
In both developed and developing countries, there has been a huge movement
from rural to urban areas since 950 (see Figure 4). Less-developed regions, in
aggregate, have seen their population shift from 8 per cent urban in 950 to 44 per
cent in 006,while the correspondingfigures for developed countries are 5 per cent
to 75 per cent. This move toward urban areas – and the concomitant urbanisation of
areas that were formerly peri-urban or rural – is consistent with the shift that nearly
all countries have experienced in moving from agricultural economies to industrial
and service-based economies.
The existence and growth of megacities (that is, those with 0 million or more
residents) is a late-20
th
century phenomenon that has created new problems. There
were 20 such cities in 2003, 5 in developing countries. Tokyo is by far the largest,
with 35 million people, followed by (in descending order) Mexico City, NewYork,
São Paulo and Mumbai (all with 7 to 9 million residents). All cities allow for
economies of scale and provide a broad mix of people and activities, making them
F�gure 13: Number of M�grants from  ess-de eloped to
More-de eloped Countr�es
Notes: Dates refer to the beginning of the 5-year window. Data after 2005 are based on projections.
Source: UN Population Division (2005)
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centres of economic growth and activity. These characteristics account, in some
measure, for their attractiveness. However, as continued movement to urban areas
leads tomegacities, these factors seem to be countered in part by problems that arise
in the areas of transportation, housing, air pollution and waste management. The
conditions in megacities may also exacerbate socioeconomic disparities.
3. �he Effect on Econom�es – H�stor�cal Background
Demographic change is consequential with respect to economic and social
development.The economic consequences of population growth, in particular, have
long been the subject of debate.
It was first believed that population growth would lead to the exhaustion of
resources. In 1798,ThomasMalthus, perhaps thefirst of the ‘population pessimists’,
arguedthat theworld’sresourceswouldbeunabletokeeppacewithpopulationgrowth.
Food production would expand more slowly than population, and many would lose
out in the competition for food. Such thinking held sway well into the 20
th
century.
In 968, Paul Ehrlich predicted: ‘The battle … is over. In the 970s ... hundreds
of millions of people are going to starve to death’ (Ehrlich 968, p xi). In the early
970s, studies by the US National Academy of Sciences and the United Nations
also predicted negative effects of population growth.
Not until the late 20
th
century did other arguments become popular. In the
last 30 years of the 20
th
century, per capita incomes rose by two-thirds as global
F�gure 14: �ercentage of �opulat�on  � �ng �n  rbanAreas
Note: Data after 2005 are based on projections.
Source: UN Population Division (2005)
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population doubled. This prompted some to askwhether, far from being a hindrance
to growth, population expansionmight in fact assist it. In the 960s, it was proposed
that population growth aided economic development by spurring technological
and institutional innovation and increasing the supply of human ingenuity. Simon
Kuznets (967), Julian Simon (98) and Ester Boserup (98) were the leaders
among the ‘population optimists’. Kuznets argued that larger societies can take
advantage of economies of scale and are better-equipped for trade. Simon showed
that the prices of natural resources decline as growing populations, complete with a
greater stock of human ingenuity, make the technological improvements necessary
to respond to increasing demand. Boserup presented compelling historical evidence
of the pressure that population growth puts on societies to create new solutions in
the face of resource constraints. The Green Revolution, for example, where new,
high-yield crops dramatically increased food production in much of the developing
world, occurred in part as a response to population growth. Although the optimists
did not believe population growth would automatically lead to economic advances,
they saw that favourable policies could help translate increases in population into
greater wealth.
Population neutralism became the predominant school of thought in the 980s
and 990s.Advocates of this position (BloomandFreeman 986;Kelley 988) took
the optimists’ observation that the consequences of population growth depended
largely on the policy environment a step further. Population neutralism was based
on empirical research showing little correlation between the growth rate of income
per capita and the rate of population growth. In other words, population growth
by itself has no effect on economic performance. Other factors such as openness
to trade, educational attainment and the quality of institutions determine whether
economicprogresscankeeppacewithpopulationexpansion.Althoughfast-growing
populations tend to experience slower economic growth, when these other factors
are taken into account, the negative impact of population expansion disappears.
Recently, population neutralism is giving way to a more fine-grained view of the
effects of population dynamics in which demographic change does affect economic
development.Economistsanddemographersnowpoint toboth theaccountingeffects
and the behavioural effects of changes in population size and structure.
4. �he Effect on Econom�es – Some New �h�nk�ng
4.1 Account�ng effects
Some of the effects of population change on economic growth result from
‘accounting’ effects. Accounting effects assume constant behaviour – in marriage,
labourparticipationorotherdecisions–withinageandotherdemographicgroups,but
allow for changes in the relative size of those groups to influence overall outcomes.
For example, holding age- and sex-specific labour force participation rates constant,
we can see how a change in the age structure affects total labour supply.
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As a country’s baby boom generation ages, for a time it constitutes a large cohort
of working-age individuals and, later, a large cohort of elderly people. The span
of years represented by the boom generation (which determines how quickly this
cohort moves through the age structure) and the size of the population bulge vary
greatly from one country to another. But in all circumstances, there are reasons to
think that a very unstable age structure has economic consequences. A historically
high proportion of working-age individuals in a population means that, potentially,
production can increase relative to consumption, and with more workers per capita,
GDP per capita can receive a boost.
Life-cycle patterns in savings also come into play as a population’s age structure
changes.People savemoreduring theirworking-ageyears. If theworking-agecohort
is especially large compared to other age groups, savings per capita will increase.
4. Beha �oural effects
Declining rates of adult mortality and the movement of large cohorts through
the global population pyramid will lead to a massive expansion in the proportion of
elderly in theworldpopulation.Somesimpleeconomicprojectionsshowcatastrophic
effectsof thisageing.Theseprojections tend tobebasedonan‘accounting’approach,
which assumes that age-specific behaviour remains unchanged and ignores the
potentially significant effects of behavioural change.
The ageing of the baby boom generation potentially promotes labour shortages,
creating upward pressure on wages and downward pressure on the real incomes
of retirees. It is likely that workers will adjust their behaviour in response to these
pressures, resulting in increased labour force participation, longer working lives
and possibly the immigration of workers from developing countries. In addition,
Bloom,CanningandMoore (004)find thathealthand longevity improvements tend,
in theory, to increase individuals’ desired age of retirement. In practice, however,
mandatory retirement and other disincentives to work at older ages lead people to
anticipate longer periods of retirement rather than longer working lives (Bloom,
Canning, Moore and Song 2006; Bloom et al, forthcoming). In response, national
saving rates tend to rise (Bloom, Canning and Graham 2003).
Childmortalitydeclinescanalsohavebehaviouraleffects,particularly forwomen,
who are likely to be the primary caregivers for children. When fertility has fallen
in response to a decrease in child mortality, more women are able to participate in
the workforce, further boosting the labour supply.
5. Emp�r�cal E �dence
Demographic change is absent from many macroeconomic analyses that aim to
explain cross-country differences in economic growth and poverty reduction. Yet
several empirical studies show the importance of demographics in understanding
economic development.

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5.1 East As�a’s baby boom
East Asia’s remarkable economic growth in the past half-century coincided
closely with demographic change in the region.As infant mortality fell from 8 to
34 per  000 births between 950 and 2000, fertility fell from around 6 to 2 children
per woman. The lag between falls in mortality and fertility created a baby boom
generation. Between 965 and 990, the region’s working-age population grew
nearly four times faster than thedependentpopulation.Several studieshaveestimated
that this demographic shift was responsible for one-third of east Asia’s economic
growth during the period (that is, the ‘demographic dividend’). (See Bloom and
Williamson 998; Bloom, Canning and Malaney 2000.)
5.  abour supply and the Celt�c t�ger
From 960 to 990, the growth rate of income per capita in Ireland was
approximately 3.5 per cent per annum. In the 990s, it jumped to 5.8 per cent, well
in excess of any other European economy. Demographic change contributed to the
country’s economic surge. In the decade following the legalisation of contraceptives
in 979, Ireland saw a sharp fall in the crude birth rate. This led to decreasing youth
dependency and a rise in the working-age share of the total population. By the
mid 990s, the dependency burden in Ireland had dropped to a level below that in
the United Kingdom.
Twoadditionaldemography-based factors in Irelandhelpedfueleconomicgrowth
by increasing labour supplypercapita.First, althoughmale labour forceparticipation
rates remained fairly static, the period from 980 to 2000 saw a substantial increase
in female labour force participation rates, particularly in the 25–40 year-old age
group. Although one would expect rapid economic growth to encourage female
labour participation, it seems likely that some of the increase can be attributed to
the availability of contraception andwomen’s increased freedom to choose between
workingand rearingchildren.Second, Irelandhistoricallyhadhigh levelsofoutward
migration of young adults (around  per cent of the population per year), because
its economy was unable to absorb the large inflows of young workers created by
its high fertility rate. The loss of these young workers exacerbated the problem of a
high youth-dependency rate. The decline in youth-cohort sizes and rapid economic
growth of the 1990s led to a reversal of this flow, resulting in net in-migration of
workers, made up partly of return migrants and also, for the first time, substantial
numbers of foreign immigrants (see Bloom and Canning 2003).
5.3 Cont�nued h�gh fert�l�ty �n Sub-Saharan Afr�ca
Demographic change of a very different type can account for slow economic
development. Much of sub-Saharan Africa remains stalled at the first stage of a
demographic transition.
3
Fertility rates actually increased a bit during the 950s
3. Some African nations – notably Zimbabwe and those in southern Africa including Namibia,
Botswana and South Africa – are beginning to experience faster fertility declines.
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and through the 970s and only recently have begun a slow fall. As swollen youth
cohorts have entered the labour force, an inadequate economic policy environment
in most countries has prevented many young people from engaging in productive
employment. Large dependent populations (in this case, of children) have kept the
proportionofworking-agepeople in the totalpopulation low,making itmoredifficult
for these economies to rise out of poverty (see Bloom and Sachs 998).
6. �ol�cy �mpl�cat�ons
Rapid and significant demographic change places new demands on national and
international policy-making. Transitions from high mortality and fertility to low
mortality and fertility can be beneficial to economies as large baby-boom cohorts
enter the workforce and save for retirement. Rising longevity also affects the
incentives to save for old age, which can affect investment, international capital
flows and interest rates.
Theabilityofcountries torealise thepotentialbenefitsof thedemographic transition
and to mitigate the negative effects of ageing depends crucially on the policy and
institutional environment. Attention to the following areas is likely to be key in
developing effective policy to deal with the effects of demographic change.
6.1 Health
Recentevidence indicates thatgoodhealthmaybean important factor ineconomic
development (see Bloom, Canning and Sevilla 2004). Health improvements
– especially among infants and children – often lead to declines in fertility. Focusing
on the diseases of childhood can therefore increase the likelihood of creating a boom
generation and the positive economic effects a boom can generate (see Bloom,
Canning and Weston 2005). Countries wishing to accelerate fertility declines may
benefit from improving access to family planning services and education about
fertility decisions.
6. Educat�on
Workers are better able to contribute to economic growth if they have received an
effective education. EastAsia capitalised on its baby boom generation by providing
high-quality education, including both general schooling and technical skills, which
equipped them as workers to meet the demands of an ever-changing labour market.
Ireland also gained from its baby boom by introducing free secondary schooling
and expanding tertiary education.
6.3  abour market �nst�tut�ons
Restrictive labour laws can limit a country’s ability to benefit from demographic
change, particularly where these laws make it difficult to hire and fire workers or
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to work part-time.
4
Restrictions on immigration are also of concern, as they hold
down the labour supply. Immigration is a political hot potato in many countries, but
economic incentives to lower barriers to immigration are likely to grow stronger
as populations in developed countries age. International outsourcing, another
controversial subject, may also be an increasingly important means of meeting the
demand for labour.
6.4 �rade
One means by which east-Asian countries provided productive opportunities to
their baby boom cohorts was by carefully opening up to international trade. The
opportunity to export provides an outlet for the product of a large cohort. Bloom and
Canning (004) found that open economies benefit much more from demographic
change than the average, and that closed economies do not derive any statistically
significant benefit from changes in the age structure.
6.5 Ret�rement
Population ageing requires increased savings to finance longer retirements
(especially if governments maintain current policies that discourage the conversion
of greater longevity into longer working lives). This will affect financial markets,
rates of return and investment.As more people move into old age, health care costs
are likely to spiral upward, with the expansion of health care systems and growth
in long-term care for the elderly. (However, Bryant and Sonerson (2006) caution
that an ageing population is not the main driver of rising expenditures on health,
showing that non-demographic factors are more substantial drivers of rising health
expenditures thandemographicones.)Asnon-tradable, labour-intensivesectorswith
a low rate of technical progress, health care and elder care may affect the structure
of the economy and potentially slow measured growth. Existing social security
systems may hamper the ability of individuals to contribute to the financing of their
retirement, as many of these systems penalise individuals who work beyond a fixed
retirement age. As Turner (2006) explains, demographic factors play a central role
in determining the potential viability of all pension systems, both fully funded and
pay-as-you-go plans. Recent work in Australia by Kulish, Smith and Kent (2006)
suggests that changes in fertility and longevity, functioning jointly, tend to increase
the ratio of capital to labour inputs, and that, on average, people would still choose
to spend a similar portion of their lives in retirement as before these changes.
4. There are also arguments on the other side of this issue that deserve consideration. For example,
in many countries, labour unions have led to improved living conditions, including for non-
members. The same might also be said of minimum wages even if, in some circumstances, they
have constrained some aspects of economic development.
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7. �h�nk�ng FarAhead: Wh�ther the Human  �fe Span?
Adiscussion thatpertains centrally to increases in life expectancyand that touches
on retirement naturally leads to the question of the human life span. How long are
people likely to live in the coming decades, and are the anticipated changes likely
to bring new issues to the fore?
In most of the world, life expectancy has risen sharply during the past two
centuries. Children born today can expect to live for many decades longer than their
ancestors born in the 9
th
or early 20
th
centuries. In Japan, life expectancy at birth
is now 82 years, and other regions have also made great progress as medical and
public health advances, improved nutrition and behavioural changes encouraged by
improved education have combined to reduce the risk of death at all ages.
Fries (1983) suggests that the human life span is more or less fixed at a certain
age and unlikely to change over time. According to this view, an accumulation of
inherited diseases express themselves in the post-reproductive years, during which
individuals’survivalconfersnoevolutionarybenefiton theirdescendants, effectively
maintaining a ceiling on life expectancy. Ronald Lee (2003), however, proposes
an evolutionary mechanism through which the human life span may increase. He
argues, essentially, that the children of individuals who are genetically disposed to
long life benefit from their parents’ and grandparents’ longevity, mainly through
intergenerational transfers (for example, time spent nurturing children). This
mechanism has acted against the accumulation of inherited diseases at the older
ages and has tended to shape the human genome in a manner that is likely to be
more responsive to the life-prolonging efforts of modern science.
Whether or not the human life span changes over time may have important
implications for societies and economies. If it remains steady at around 85 years, the
fraction of people living beyond that age is unlikely to grow significantly or rapidly.
If it increases, on the other hand, societies may face a number of new challenges. In
oneplausible scenario, health care costswill risewith increasingnumbersofveryold
individuals;pensionandsocialsecuritypaymentswillcomeunder increasingpressure;
the dependency ratio will shift, leaving relatively smaller working-age populations
with an increased number of elderly dependents to support; and societies will have
to adapt to the social and cultural impacts of the new demographic realities. But
even if life spans increase significantly, it is possible that most of these predictions
will not come to pass. Fries discusses a phenomenon known as ‘the compression
of morbidity’ – meaning that the illnesses associated with old age may come to
arise sufficiently later in life so that, even with increased life spans, the elderly may
have fewer years during which they are dependent on working-age people. If this
is correct, the predictions above will be incorrect, particularly if people choose to
retire later or save more early in life.
Continuing increases in life expectancy in low-mortality populations have led
some demographers to forecast further gains. They believe that scientific advances
will continue to combine with behavioural changes to yield further life expectancy
gains in the future. Manton, Stallard and Tolley (99), for example, estimate that
populations with extremely healthy lifestyles – that is, with an absence or near-
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absence of risk factors such as smoking, alcohol and obesity, and the presence of
health-promoting behaviours such as a healthy diet and exercise – could achieve
a life expectancy of between 95 and 00 years. Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) found
that death rates among the very old in Sweden and throughout the industrial world
fell substantially in the last century, and at an accelerating pace, reflecting bona fide
life-span improvements. They forecast that life expectancy at birth in low-mortality
countries will rise to 00 years by 2060. Along the same lines, Preston (996)
observes that 60 per cent of the life expectancy increase in the United States since
950 was due to mortality declines in people over the age of 50. Li and Lee (2005)
estimate that life expectancy in the United States will rise from a 1996 figure of
76.3 to 84.9 by 2050, with that in Japan rising from 80.5 to 88..
Othershave reacheddifferent conclusions.OlshanskyandCarnes (994)question
the models used by demographers which underpin predictions that life expectancy
will increase dramatically; Olshansky, Carnes and D�sesquelles (200) predict that
life expectancy at birth will not surpass 85 years. Death rates, they argue, would not
fall sufficiently for life expectancy to rise rapidly, and earlier increases were driven
largely by dramatic reductions in infant and child mortality, which could not recur.
Perhapsmore importantly, theyseenoreasonwhythefutureshouldnecessarilymirror
the past – new threats to health such as influenza pandemics, antibiotic resistance
and obesity (discussed subsequently in Preston 2005) could reverse gains made in
recent decades; technological improvements could stall and the drugs needed to
counter the diseases of ageing might not be found; and environmental disasters,
economic collapse orwar could derail health systems at the same time asweakening
individuals’ ability to protect their own health.
The debate continues, and many questions remain unanswered.What will be the
effect on the human life span of advances in genetics?Will anti-ageing technologies
emerge to make the human body more robust for longer? Will wealthy societies
succumb to damaging obesity epidemics or to new infectious diseases such as avian
flu?Will economic meltdown take away the wealth that has contributed so much to
improvements in health? Or will wars result in massive premature mortality, and
thereby render the average life span a far less compelling issue?
8.  ook�ng to the Future
What can we expect in the next half-century? Based on the indicators that are
available, we can make a few points.
• All signs suggest that there will be continued but slowing population growth.
This continued growthwill result in the addition of roughly 3 billion people to the
world population, before it stabilises around 2050 at about 9 billion. Managing
this increase will be an enormous challenge, and the economic consequences of
failing to do so could be severe.
• The world’s population is ageing, and the growth in the sheer number of
elderly people will be huge. The United Nations predicts that 3 per cent of
China’s population in 2050 – 432 million people – will be aged 60 or over. The
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corresponding figures for India are 1 per cent and 330 million (see Figure 15).
No longer can ageing be thought of as a developed-world phenomenon. (Further
comparisonofChinaand India’sdemographicdevelopmentas it hasaffected their
economic development can be found in Bloom, Canning, Hu et al (2006).)
• International migration will continue, but the extent is unclear. The pressures
that encourage people to migrate – above all the lure of greater economic well-
being in the developed countries – will undoubtedly persist, but the strength of
countervailing policy restrictions that could substantially staunch the flow of
migrants is impossible to predict.
• Urbanisationwill continue, buthere, too, thepace is impossible topredict.Greater
economic opportunities in the cities will surely continue to attract migrants from
rural areas, but environmental and social problems may stymie growth.
Although demographic changes are, for the most part, easier to predict than
economic changes, the big-picture outlook is nonetheless unclear. The uncertainties
are similar to those we cited regarding possible changes in the human life span.
Will an outbreak of avian flu or another disease become pandemic, killing many
millions and decimating economies?What happens if these diseases are, or become,
resistant toexistingdrugs?Conversely, scientificadvances inareassuchasgenomics,
contraceptivemethods, or vaccines for diseases such asAIDS ormalaria could save
and improvemillions of lives. Globalwarming and other environmental changes, or
large-scale war, could completely alter the context of demographic and economic
F�gure 15: Growth of Elderly �opulat�on �n Ch�na and �nd�a
Percentage aged 60+
Note: Data after 2005 are based on projections.
Source: UN Population Division (2005)
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predictions.Millionsof refugees, fromanycause,could leaddemographicpredictions
to be far off the mark, and could, of course, lead to upheavals that would dwarf the
importance of the analysis offered here.
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Append� A: Notes on Source, Country Groups, Co erage
Period, Definitions and Assumptions
Source
All data and charts are taken directly from, or calculated on the basis of UN
Population Division (2005), World Population Prospects: The 00 Revision,
United Nations, New York. See �http:��www.un.org�esa�population�publications�
WPP2004�2004EnglishES.pdf> for the Executive Summary of UN Population
Division (2005) (including the assumptions).
Definition of country groups
TheUNdefines ‘more-developed regions’as ‘all regions ofEurope plusNorthern
America, Australia�New Zealand and Japan’. ‘Less-developed regions’means ‘all
regions of Africa, Asia (excluding Japan), Latin America and the Caribbean plus
Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia’.
Thelistof ‘more-developed’countriesconsistsof thefollowing:Albania,Australia,
Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Channel
Islands, Croatia, theCzechRepublic,Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of
Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, TFYR Macedonia, Ukraine, the United
Kingdom and the United States of America. All other countries are classified by
the UN as ‘less-developed’.
Co erage per�od
The source presents data for 950–2050. The United Nations presents some data
for exact years (1950, 1955, etc) and other data for five-year periods (1950–55,
955–60, etc). For the former, projections aremade for 200–2050; for the latter, for
2005–200 to 2045–2050. For urban population shares, projections extend only to
2030. In each case, July  is the reference date. Data presented for exact years are:
population, population by any specific age group, population by sex and the urban
population share. Variables presented for five-year periods are: crude birth rate,
crude death rate, total fertility rate, infant mortality rate, life expectancy, population
growth rate, migration rate and number of migrants.
Definitions
The source document uses the following definitions:
Total fertility: children per woman
Crude birth rate: births per thousand population
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Crude death rate: deaths per thousand population
Infant mortality rate: infant deaths per thousand live births, for both sexes
combined
Life expectancy: expectation of life at birth for both sexes combined (years)
Population growth rate: average annual rate of population change (per cent)
Migrant numbers: net number of migrants, both sexes combined (thousands)
– defined such that a positive number ofmigrantsmeans that immigrants outnumber
emigrants
Migration rate: crude net migration rate (net migrants per thousand population)
– defined such that a positive rate means that immigrants outnumber emigrants
Percentage urban population: there is no simple definition for ‘urban’ in UN data.
Demographic, administrative, and economic criteria used to report figures on
urbanisation differ across countries.
In addition, we have defined two age groups, as follows:
Working age: 5–64
Non-working age: 0–4 and 65+
Assumpt�ons
Fertility
The UN uses several differing assumptions about future fertility in making its
projections. For the data and figures in this paper, we have used the UN’s ‘medium-
fertility variant’ in all instances in which more than one variant is available: total
fertility rate, crude birth rate, crude death rate, population (for all age groups),
population growth rate, migration rate and number of migrants.
For themedium-fertilityvariant, theUNassumes forall countries that fertilitywill
gradually converge to .85 children per woman. It does not assume that countries
will necessarily reach that level by 2050. For high- and medium-fertility countries
(that is, those with total fertility at or below 2. children per woman in 2000–2005),
projections are built on the experience of all countries that experienced fertility
declines during the past half-century. If a country’s fertility rate is projected to fall to
.85 before 2050, theUNmodel assumes itwill then remain at that level. Projections
are not done mechanistically; they are always checked against recent trends in a
specific country. In some instances, these recent trends require an adjustment in
projections for the coming five or ten years, after which time projections revert to
the basic fertility projection model. For low-fertility countries whose fertility rate
is currently below .85, the model used by the UN assumes that fertility in the
coming five to ten years will follow recent trends and will then increase at a rate of
0.07 children every five years.
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Mortality
The UN also makes assumptions about future mortality rates, which affect most
of the data in the figures in this paper. UN projections take into account recent
sex-specific trends and are based on the expectation that life expectancy will rise
more slowly in countries that have already reached a fairly high level. For those
indicators for which theUNprovides data specific to various possible courses of the
HIV�AIDS epidemic, we have used only the ‘normal mortality assumption’ (which
uses a model that takes HIV�AIDS into consideration and, for countries with high
levels of the disease, projects a ‘slowdown in the reduction of general mortality
risks not related to HIV�AIDS’).
Migration
For migration numbers and rates, the UN assumes for most countries that
migration patterns will change very slowly after the period 200–205, compared
with the speed at which such patterns changed in the past. Projections are based on
past trends and take into account countries’ current policies regarding international
migration.
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